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1962/03/13

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

13 March 1962
(280)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).
(1)

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.
(2)

Attachments

Distribution:

Copy: To:
1 - General Taylor
2 - The Attorney General
3 - Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
4 - Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
5 - General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)
6/7 - Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey)
8 - Mr. Murrow/Mr. Wilson
9/10 - Chief of Operations

Excluded from automatic
regrading: DOD Directive
5200.10 does not apply.

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OPERATION MONOOSE
PHASE I (Sate)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.	Activities in consonance with U. S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.	These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.

March - July 1962

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (Defense)

March - July 1962

CONSIDERATIONS

1. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.

2. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide sensitive intelligence on Cuban activities.

3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention.

PURPOSE

- To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To add to the U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.

Use of bases near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties.
(Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visitability of operational interests is an acceptable risk here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U.S. military manpower and equipment.

The U.S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures is reduced to a minimum.

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**OPERATION MONOOSE
PHASE I (USIA)**

ACTIVITY

Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralise its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I Intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE II (State)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. Make political decision to intervene with U.S. military forces in Cuba.	To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.S. to become involved in assuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution; this involvement must include the commitment of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.	This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessment in perspective of world opinion and U.S. security interests.
2. U.S. officials and news releases on policy decision.	Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.	Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cuban. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.
3. Latin American leaders, government and public, in support.	Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, and other key countries and into Cuba by against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.	Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (Defense)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. After a political decision, provide maximum U.S. support to resistance fighters in Cuba who have been spared in Phase I.	To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Communist regime's military and police forces; as part of the assurance, the U.S. support must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.	DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of equipment and personnel for commitment must be developed with maximum lead time. Close coordination with CIA is required to insure maximum readiness to meet the immediate needs of the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility in preparing for these support activities makes security a paramount consideration.
2. After political decision, commit U.S. military forces in accordance with contingency plans.	To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.	Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness to accomplish the assigned mission. The military force must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (CIA)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. Support U. S. military actions in Cuba.	To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U. S. military operations.	CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed and considered in the development of military planning. Executive responsibility for directing the use of covert assets must be clearly understood as resting in the U. S. military commander of the U. S. intervention, as is agreed-upon warlike operations.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (USIA)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. Increase news emphasis on Cuban revolt and intervention from the [redacted] to help the Cuban movement.	To neutralise opposition to U.S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.	Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.

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~~OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (CIA)~~

~~ACTIVITY~~

~~INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS~~

1. Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key areas selected by CIA.

Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.

15 March 1962

~~PURPOSE~~

~~CONSIDERATIONS~~

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is minimal, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant.

2. 3 third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana.
3. 2 third-country trained intelligence officers, ready to travel in Cuba for temporary periods.
- To collect intelligence.
- To collect intelligence.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Kriegsmittel) - 5, March 1962.

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PURPOSE

- * Caribbean Admission Center,
Opa-Locka, Florida, fully
activated by 15 March 1962.

CONDITIONS

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- To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February, and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, TISIA, and

• **Benzodiazepines**

5. • Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.

OTHER OPERATIONS

WHITEHORN OPEN SOURCE

7. • Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

16 - 31 March 1962

To collect intelligence.

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

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~~Mr. John Marshall (cont'd.)~~

PURPOSE

8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.

9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.

To ready agent operations.

10. Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors.

If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)

11. Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible.

If possible, in [] local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers. [] are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

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17
15 April 1962

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

12. • Two teams of agents dis-patched to Cuba.

13. 15 third-country agents, tem-porarily travelling legally, in Cuba.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

14. • Two teams of agents dis-patched to Cuba.

15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

N
16 / 30 April 1962

Number of agents undetermined as yet.
Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circum-stances.

Possible use for communications and support.

N
17 / 15 May 1962

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circum-stances.

17. 3 legal resident agents in Cuba.

- Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

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ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

18. One or possibly two trained staff intelligence officers (non-U. S.) resident in Havana.

To collect intelligence.

19. Ten legal travellers in Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16-131 May 1962

20. Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines.

To collect intelligence.

22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents.

To ready agent operations.

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

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